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Historical consciousness: the enigma of diﬀerent paradigms
Maria Grever and Robbert-Jan Adriaansen
Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
To make historical consciousness beneﬁcial for history education
research we need to disentangle its multidisciplinary backgrounds so
that contradictory approaches and outcomes can be avoided. The aim of
this article therefore is to clarify the enigma of its diﬀerent paradigms.
We will discuss two interrelated paradigms: one interpreting historical
consciousness as a collective phenomenon that is characteristic for mod-
ern Western society, and the other treating historical consciousness on
an individual level as a cognitive-epistemological category. We will show
that several misunderstandings in educational research about historical
consciousness result from the conﬂation of both conceptualisations and
its underlying paradigms. Yet, by highlighting Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
notion of Wirkungsgeschichte (historical eﬀect) we will argue that both
conceptualisations are not entirely mutually exclusive. Including histori-
cally eﬀected consciousness in the notion of historical consciousness
does oﬀer a wide range of opportunities, for history education scholars






‘Salute to SS men? Never!’ This was a headline in the Dutch newspaper De Gelderlander on
16 July 2018, referring to a commemoration by uniformed German military at the war cemetery
in Ysselsteyn near the German border (Vogels, 2018). Every year soldiers from many countries
walk the famous International Four Days Marches in Nijmegen. On their day oﬀ the Germans and
other militaries from Canada, the UK and the Netherlands take the opportunity to commemorate
their compatriots who had fallen during the Second World War. Ysselsteyn is the largest German
military cemetery in the Netherlands: almost 32.000 Wehrmacht and Waﬀen-SS soldiers, war
criminals and Dutch collaborators are buried there. The German commemoration at Ysselsteyn
evoked conﬂicting responses. Dutch and German antifascist organizations protested ﬁercely.
They argued that one does not salute ‘these SS soldiers and Dutch accomplices responsible for
the deportation of 100.000 Dutch Jews’ (Vogels, 2018). The educator of the cemetery explained
that this was not an oﬃcial commemoration and pointed to the fact that 1.400 child soldiers—
boys in their early teens—are buried there as well.
Whatever we think or feel about the dispute, it obviously reveals that the involved parties are
clearly aware of the impact of World War II, but attribute opposing meanings to this commemora-
tion. These attributions stem from diﬀerent interpretative frameworks. Growing up in communities
with speciﬁc stories, images, rituals and silences about the past, people seek for, create or adjust
existing narratives they want to be part of while avoiding others. This whole process of becoming
aware of any past in the present is dynamic and constantly changing, both on collective and
individual levels, and is usually referred to as ‘historical consciousness’.
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Although the concept of historical consciousness is subject of an incredible amount of studies
(see e.g. Clark & Grever, 2018, pp. 178–179), its meaning and empirical application remain vague
and rather enigmatic. One of the reasons is that the concept is grounded in various philosophical,
anthropological, historiographic and educational disciplines with diﬀerent normative (political or
didactic) agendas. Within the educational discipline, Körber (2016, p. 442) points to the diversity of
conceptual uses and functions of historical consciousness, both nationally and internationally.
Several education researchers also question the Western (Eurocentric) bias of the concept (e.g.
Körber, 2016; Rüsen, 2002; Seixas, 2012). It is, however, precisely in this ﬁeld that researchers tend
to use the concept in ahistorical ways, leading to the perpetuation of a Western conception of
history as linear development. Körber’s distinction (2016, p. 444) between a narrow and a broad
deﬁnition of the concept of historical consciousness does not solve this problem either, as we shall
show later in our argumentation. Hence, we urgently need to clarify the multidisciplinary back-
grounds of historical consciousness and disentangle the paradigms and approaches that have
shaped its conceptualization. Our aim is not only to gain a better understanding of the layered
meanings of historical consciousness but most of all to enhance the opportunities of the concept
for a more encompassing application in history education research and education practices. We
also hope that our explanation can support history and museum educators when dealing with
emotional responses of students and visitors like in the case of the military commemoration ritual
in Ysselsteyn.
In this article we will disentangle two interrelated paradigms in the humanities: the ﬁrst one
considers historical consciousness as a collective phenomenon and studies its perceived rise as
a pivotal moment in the genesis of modern self-understanding; the second one treats historical
consciousness as an individual competence and usesit for the training of cognitive capacities with
which people can understand the past. Whereas the ﬁrst paradigm is used in cultural, intellectual
and conceptual history, the second is prominent in history education research. Next, we will discuss
a third tradition in the humanities that links the two paradigms: the philosophical hermeneutics of
Hans-Georg Gadamer. We will show that this tradition is of particular value for educational research
(Nixon, 2017), but that its opportunities have not been thoroughly explored.
We start in the ﬁrst section with an explanation of the emergence of the concept of historical
consciousness, conceived as a collective mentality in cultural and intellectual history. We will
subsequently discuss the limits of this approach by pairing the concept of historical conscious-
ness with the concept of historical culture. In the second section we will show how the meaning
of historical consciousness in history didactics and history education research developed mainly
as a cognitive-epistemological category. The third section focuses on Gadamer’s ontological
approach of hermeneutics in order to show that both paradigms are not entirely mutually
exclusive, and can—in some cases—be fruitfully combined. In order to reach the concept’s
potential, we argue with Gadamer that a hermeneutic-ontological approach needs to be taken
into account in conceptualizing historical consciousness, because one of the main reasons for
historical consciousness perpetuating a Western bias is its treatment as a mere cognitive-
epistemological category in history education practices and research. In the fourth section we
explore a number of ways in which this hermeneutic approach can be beneﬁcial for history
education research, particularly for understanding and applying multiperspectivity.
1. Historical consciousness as part of historical culture
Historians generally treat historical consciousness as that part of modern consciousness that is
concerned with the past. In this view, historical consciousness emerged as a collective mentality
closely linked to the rise of modernity and what has been called the ‘acceleration of history’
(Halévy, 1948; Koselleck, 1979/2000, pp. 63–64). The speeding up of historical developments in
eighteenth-century Western society resulted in a view of history as a holistic process of progress
aimed at an unknown, open future (Koselleck, 1979/2000, p. 143). This linear understanding of
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history supplanted earlier ‘cyclical’ humanist notions of time, which understood the past as
a reservoir of exempla that could serve as models for future action (Hartog, 2015, p. 72ﬀ). The
present was seen as a continuation of the past, and changes were interpreted as temporary
disturbances of the natural state (Blaas, 1978). Reinhart Koselleck has famously proposed his idea
of a Sattelzeit that stretches from approximately 1750 to 1850 in which these earlier understandings
of history were gradually replaced by, or reinvented as modern historical consciousness (Koselleck,
1972, p. XXVI). It has, for example, been argued that the linear aspects of modern historical
consciousness are the result of a secularization of Christian eschatology (Löwith, 1957). Modern
historical consciousness understands the past to be essentially diﬀerent from the present, and
cannot accept tradition as a prescriptive guide for future action because contemporary demands
are not the same as demands in the past (Clark & Grever, 2018, p. 179). For this reason, Wolfgang
Reinhard has argued that ‘the “modern period” was the only age that ever existed, because it
thought of and created itself as a historical period’ (Reinhard, 1997, p.291).
The entanglement of historical consciousness and historical reality—to which Reinhard refers—
causes a dilemma, as only two options seem to be available: either modern historical consciousness
invents historical reality through historical imagination and the ‘pastness of the past’ is just an
eﬀect of consciousness, or historical consciousness is the result of historical circumstances—e.g. the
acceleration of history due to external societal developments—and thus a subjective awareness of
an objectively existing distance. The ‘pastness of the past’ is then an attribute of historical reality
and can be discovered in a learning process. Both options are not unproblematic as they raise
many questions concerning the assumptions behind the semantics and conceptualisations of
historical consciousness. Generally, history education scholars such as Shemilt (2000), Lee and
Ashby (2000) and Rüsen (2004) have based their argument on the second viewpoint and assume
that—according to didactic principles—this subjective awareness of a changing society can be
enhanced by training (Körber, 2016, p. 446). We will elaborate on this issue later in our article.
For now, let us brieﬂy focus on the ﬁrst approach. When historians interpret historical con-
sciousness as a deﬁning feature of modern self-understanding, the question is raised about the
relationship between historical consciousness and the cultural expressions thereof: historical
culture. German scholars have argued that historical consciousness and historical culture are
intrinsically related. They conceptualize historical consciousness as an individual and mental
process, which is expressed in the construction of a shared, collective historical culture. Historical
culture and historical consciousness then appear as two sides of the same coin (Rüsen, 1997, 2017,
p. 168; Triepke, 2011). But if one interprets historical culture as an expression of historical
consciousness, one assumes historical consciousness to exist outside of historical culture providing
it with an essentialist and a-historical meaning.
Hence the issue is to historicize and dynamise historical consciousness. To tackle this, we
have deﬁned historical culture as a holistic concept that oﬀers the possibility to investigate the
diﬀerent ways in which people give meaning to the past (Grever & Adriaansen, 2017). Although
all cultures have an understanding of the three temporal dimensions past, present and future,
the meaning cultures attribute to these temporal dimensions is historically and culturally
variable. For this reason, we have deﬁned historical culture as an inclusive concept that tries
to avoid a prioritization of a modern Western or Eurocentric understanding of history, as had
been the case in many history didactics studies (Seixas, 2016a, p. 429). This concept encom-
passes not only the speciﬁc contents of collective memory and historical imagination, but also
the ways in which relationships to the past are established in a dynamic interaction between
human agency, tradition, performance of memory, historical representations and their dissemi-
nation, as well as the presumptions about what exactly constitutes history. For that reason, we
have distinguished three mutually dependent and interactive levels of analysis in the study of
historical culture: 1. historical narratives and performances of the past; 2. mnemonic infrastruc-
tures; 3. conceptions of history.
816 M. GREVER AND R.-J. ADRIAANSEN
Now, in this approach historical consciousness is primarily related to the third level: the often
implicit but no less inﬂuential conceptions of history which shape speciﬁc historical practices of
historical cultures and vice versa. Conceptions of history are speciﬁc interpretations of the relation-
ship between the three temporal dimensions past, present and future that determine on the one
hand a degree of human agency and on the other the epistemological (im)possibilities to know the
past (Grever & Adriaansen, 2017, pp. 81–82). They interpret and give meaning to the historicity of
human existence, and can take many forms. In the modern conception of history, the conﬁguration
of the three temporal dimensions indicates an understanding of history as a ‘collective singular’
(Koselleck, 1979/2000, p. 51) comprising a unidirectional path from the past into the future that is
carried by human (not divine) actions that create a chain of cause and eﬀect. Although conceptions
of history tend to proclaim universality, they are not universal. Instead, they vary in time and space;
they overlap, entangle or conﬂict with other conceptions of history. Notions of human agency
being the driving force of history may be at odds with, for example, the eschatologies of the
monotheistic religions—such as Christianity—which conﬂict with the idea of time being inﬁnite
and with the notion of an open, unknown future. But even the conception of uni-directionality
itself is not universal. For instance, the Aymara people in northern Chile use a spatial construal of
time with a rather static mapping of past and future (Núňez & Sweetser, 2006). Metaphorically
Aymara speakers place the known past in front before them, and the unknown and unknowable
future behind their back. This approach is expressed in the word for future time, q’ipa pacha, of
which q’ipa translates as ‘behind’ or ‘the back’. The impression is also that the Aymara seem
uninterested in going ‘forward’ and progress (see for instance on this issue, situated in the context
of the Greek island Naxos, also Stewart, 2012).
Instead of seeing historical culture as an expression of historical consciousness, we recognize
historical consciousness as a part of historical culture. Historical consciousness is not just an
individual mental process, but is also understood as a mode of relating to the past that is
characteristic for a particular historical culture—namely of modern Western historical culture.
Seeing historical culture as the expression of historical consciousness would hamper
a historicizing and dynamic approach towards historical culture, as it would presuppose
a modern conception of history behind all historical cultures. By emphasizing that historical
consciousness can entail diﬀerent things in diﬀerent historical cultures (Schott, 1968; Assmann,
2007, p. 66ﬀ.) and in order to grasp these dynamics, it is important to study historical conscious-
ness in relationship to the conceptions of history of a particular historical culture (Grever &
Adriaansen, 2017). The fact that this variability in the meaning of historical consciousness has
been somewhat overlooked in history education research has led to a conceptual confusion that
we would like to clarify by disentangling the second, educational, paradigm that understands
historical consciousness as an individual competence of historical understanding from the para-
digm that understands historical consciousness as a collective mentality we have just discussed.
2. Historical consciousness and history education
In the past decades, historical consciousness has become one of the central concepts of history
education and didactics. Strengthening historical consciousness was the innovative educational
approach of new history education curricula in Sweden in the 1990s (Thorp, 2014), somewhat later
also in the Netherlands (Wilschut, 2002), and currently in sixteen German state history curricula
(Kölbl & Konrad, 2015, p. 23; cfr Seixas, 2017, p. 61). In history education scholarship the concept is
treated quite diﬀerently compared to the aforementioned intellectual and conceptual historians
who investigated historical consciousness as a shift in historical mentality on a collective level.
Scholars in didactics and history education research do not question the conceptual origin of
historical consciousness; its relevance is more or less taken for granted—certainly within the
context of Western societies. Initially, this ﬁeld broadly used the concept in reference to the
awareness that people live in time and that societies and institutions have historically developed
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and have a future that awaits them (Jeismann, 1988). Later history education researchers stressed
a competency approach concerning the cognitive and epistemological aspects of historical con-
sciousness, with the aim of thematising historical understanding as something that is not isolated,
but serves students in contemporary life. Nevertheless, within this ﬁeld there are both diﬀerences
and parallel developments that have emerged in speciﬁc national and linguistic contexts (Seixas,
2015).
In the UK the empirical research of Lee and Ashby (2000), Shemilt (1980, 2000), and others has
been very inﬂuential in the 1970s-80s focus on a more discipline-oriented approach of history
education. In their view history education involves more than telling stories and learning factual
knowledge, it also means advancing students’ capacity to apply historical skills and meta-historical
concepts, such as ‘evidence’ or ‘continuity and change’ (Seixas & Morton, 2013). In 1980 the
Cambridge History Project developed a curriculum based on so-called second order concepts
(e.g. evidence, explanation, historical account), while Lee and Ashby (2000) identiﬁed a six-staged
model of historical learning (Levesque & Clark, 2018, p. 121). Some years later Lee provided a list of
seven historical consciousness criteria to determine students’ capacity to historicize and under-
stand their own relationship to the past, such as ﬁeld (the ability to incorporate wider areas and
longer time-spans) and coherence (the ability to make internal connexions, including explanatory
ones, within strands). The expectation was ‘that there would be progression in these areas as
students moved through school’ (Lee, 2004b, p. 13; cfr. Clark & Grever, 2018, p. 191).
In Germany, research into historical consciousness has been far more inspired by the philosophy
of history. Hans Jürgen Pandel (1987) published on the dimensions of historical consciousness in an
attempt to operationalise the concept for history education research and its application in teaching
practices. He distinguished no less than nine dimensions, of which the awareness of time,
historicity and reality are considered crucial (Grever & Van Boxtel, 2014, pp. 83–84). Jörn Rüsen
(1989, 2004) further elaborated the competency approach by stressing ﬁrst of all the competency
to orient oneself in time related to daily practical life. Conceptualizing historical consciousness as
a synthesis of moral and temporal consciousness, he developed a theoretical model that could
reveal ‘the procedures of historical consciousness’ (Rüsen, 2004, p. 79). This model entails
a sequence of four types or stages of historical consciousness leading to an increasingly critical
historical understanding: 1. the traditional stage recognizes the continuity of tradition—historical
inheritance becomes a sort of prescription; 2. the exemplary stage uses the past to instruct
contemporary action and belief; 3. the critical stage deconstructs any necessary continuity of
tradition; 4. the genetic stage recognizes that time has changed and historicizes diﬀerence across
time as a process of dynamic development. Although Rüsen has argued that his model is not
prescriptive, it undeniably demonstrates a certain ontogeny. In his view this model is a tool to
‘construct a theory of ontogenetic development of historical consciousness’ (Rüsen, 2004, p. 78).
Rüsen (2005, p. viii) also opposes a hierarchical approach, but what that means in practice is
unclear. Despite the fact that Rüsen has stimulated international research on history education
tremendously, his model of historical consciousness has also been criticized, particularly for not
including the development of students’ ideas about the nature of history as a discipline (Lee,
2004a, p. 140–141).
In the 1990s, similar to the UK, American and Canadian scholars investigated the practical
aspects of history education and less the theoretical principles of historical consciousness (Seixas,
2015, p. 4). In the USA, the ‘cognitive revolution’ in learning and teaching—introduced by Jerome
Bruner (1960)—resulted in a shift from memorizing unquestioned historical narratives in history
classes to ‘acts of meaning and sense making’ (Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000, p. 4). Particularly
Sam Wineburg’s famous book Historical thinking and other unnatural acts (2001) pays attention to
reading sources (e.g. documents, newspapers) historically so that students become aware of, for
instance, the document’s identity (e.g. who produced it, when and where) and its context (the
circumstances). Instead of presenting a trajectory of stepping stones he basically considers histor-
ical thinking as dealing with the tension between the familiar and the strange past, ‘between
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feelings of proximity and feelings of distance in relation to the people we seek to understand’.
Hence the importance of the capacity ‘to change the basic mental structures we use to grasp the
meaning of the past’ (Wineburg, 2001, p. 5–7).
In 2002, Peter Seixas founded the Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness in Vancouver,
marked by an international conference, which resulted in the publication of the volume Theorizing
historical consciousness (Seixas, 2004). This volume is in fact the ﬁrst encounter between on the one
hand the German discourse on Geschichtsbewusstsein represented by Rüsen and on the other hand
the empirical research of British, US and Canadian scholars on the practical use and operationalisa-
tion of the term historical consciousness, as represented by Lee (Seixas, 2016a, p. 429). The Centre
stimulated and explored various aspects of historical consciousness, such as visualizations and
diﬀerent narratives (Anderson, 2017; Seixas, 2004). Most important is that this Centre contributed
to a large-scale empirical research project in Canada about the role history plays in contemporary
society and how people engage with the past in daily life (Conrad et al., 2013). Moreover, the
Centre also organized the Historical Thinking Project, which published a practical guidebook, The
big six. Historical thinking concepts (Seixas & Morton, 2013). Seixas implicitly assumes a correlation
between the development of historical consciousness and students’ capacity for historical thinking.
Inspired by Megill (1994), he designed a history/memory matrix to clarify the various roles of
history education. The matrix bridges historical practices based on the historical discipline with its
emphasis on developing competencies and mnemonic beliefs embedded in the (overlapping)
public memories of larger and smaller communities students bring into the classroom (Seixas,
2016b). In this matrix the signiﬁcance of competencies is somewhat reduced.
At the same time, German researchers have taken much eﬀort in the elaboration of Rüsen’s
theoretical model into a set of concrete skills. As part of the collaborative HiTCH (Historical
Thinking–Competencies in History) project, Körber and Meyer-Hamme have developed the ‘FUER-
model’ as a framework for assessment and attainment in historical consciousness, consisting of four
competencies of historical consciousness: 1. competence in questioning, or enquiry; 2. methodo-
logical competence; 3. orientational competence (in relation to time); 4. disciplinary competence
(in using the concepts of historical practice) (Körber & Meyer-Hamme, 2015). Particularly Körber
(2015, p. 19) considers historical consciousness a competence—‘a competence to think historically’.
In his view historical thinking aﬀects a number of dispositions such as norms, values, identities, and
ideas about the nature and purpose of history. As these interrelated dispositions support students’
temporal orientation and identiﬁcation, it is the complex of abstract dispositions infused by
historical thinking that Körber calls historical consciousness. Similar to Rüsen’s four stages of
historical consciousness, Körber’s approach indicates a development from a mental tabula rasa
state to a state of full historical consciousness. Departing from a tabula rasa-like state of ignorance
and indiﬀerence towards the past, historical consciousness progresses through a second state of
uncritical appropriation of the past, to a third state of knowledge-based understanding of the past,
to a ﬁnal stage of full historical consciousness that equals a critical understanding of one’s own
historicity.
Recently, based on Rüsen’s theoretical framework, similar debates developed in Spain, Portugal
and Latin America. For instance, Miguel-Revilla and Sánchez-Agustí (2018) discussed the relation
between historical consciousness and second order concepts of historical thinking, and Barca and
Schmidt (2013) investigated students’ historical consciousness in a qualitative study carried out in
Brazilian and Portuguese schools.
In the context of this article, the above account of reﬂections on historical consciousness in
diﬀerent countries is necessarily concise. Nevertheless, the observed close connections between
historical consciousness and historical thinking competences with complex schemes and
matrixes of increasing historical consciousness tends to mimic the supposed pattern of the
past. The risk is that the road to consciousness is explained as a model of progressive devel-
opment, more or less similar to how modern historical consciousness understands history in
general, a model that is characterized by a particular Hegelian rationale with all the problems
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that it brings. We could agree that a toddler, with no understanding of chronology, displays
‘historical ignorance’, but should we deny decades of postcolonial criticism by characterizing
non-Western cultures as such?
3. Historical consciousness and hermeneutic philosophy
The reason for modelling the development of historical consciousness after the modern conception
of history could be that it explains how it is possible that an understanding of the past equals an
understanding of the self. In any case a theory of understanding must somehow link the subject of
understanding to the object of understanding. Historically, however, the ties between the past and
the understanding thereof have been rooted diﬀerently. It has been argued that the concept of
historical consciousness stems from Hegelian philosophers who used the term to describe Hegel’s
philosophical system (Von Renthe-Fink, 1971). To Hegel, history is the expression of the developing
self-consciousness of Spirit (Geist). Spirit reﬂects a principle of thought that signiﬁes the unity of
human individual consciousness and a pantheistic form of general or divine consciousness. Spirit is
imagined as an absolute Spirit that expresses itself both in human subjectivity as well as ‘objec-
tively’ in culture and society in terms of institutions and ideas. In Hegel’s view, history is the
growing self-consciousness of Spirit, which means that through human subjectivity Spirit estab-
lishes the understanding that history and culture are no objectively existing entities that somehow
call upon the individual, but that this objective world is the product of Spirit (Sedgwick, 2015). It is
relevant for our investigation to note that the Hegelian framework does provide an intrinsic link
between historical reality and the understanding—or consciousness—thereof, namely by detach-
ing the Spirit from the individual and subordinating individual consciousness to that of
a pantheistic, supra-temporal (i.e. eternal) Spirit of which historical reality is also an expression.
For Hegel individual historical consciousness is not a consciousness of a relationship of the
individual to a past that objectively existed—i.e. a consciousness of continuity and discontinuity,
of cause and eﬀect or of historical distance—rather it is a consciousness of the fact that history
itself is the product of Spirit (Hüﬀer, 2002).
In the course of the nineteenth century Hegel’s idealist framework—primarily the a priori
assumptions on which it rested—was scrutinized, but the concept survived in the late nineteenth
century philosophy of history of Wilhelm Dilthey (De Mul, 2004; Dilthey, 2002). Dilthey recognized
historical consciousness constituting the historical worldview of the modern West, but unlike Hegel
he situated the possibilities of knowing the past not in an abstract notion of Spirit, but in a notion
of life experience (Erlebnis). Through using our own life experiences, it is possible to reconstruct the
type of experiences of which a particular source is an expression, and hence to understand its
meaning. This approach may have revitalized the concept of historical consciousness, but it had
not eradicated the problem of resorting to some type of metaphysics to connect past to present —
in this case the universal validity of experience was assumed. This is what Hans-Georg Gadamer
strove to solve.
At ﬁrst glance, Gadamer’s understanding of historical consciousness appears to be ambiguous. On
the one hand, Gadamer does recognize historical consciousness to be a consciousness of the ﬁnitude
and relativity of all historical phenomena, as it arose in the late 1800s (Makita, 1993, p. 323), ﬁrmly in
line with the mentality approach. He argued that the development of the hermeneutical method in
the modern period culminated in the rise of historical consciousness (Gadamer, 2006, p. 175),
marking a radical rupture with former centuries. Yet in his view the broken relationship with a self-
evident tradition may not hamper our awareness of its impact. He agrees in this respect with other
hermeneutic philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur who summarized this transition by his statement that
people in earlier epochs had thought of themselves as having a history, that they did not think of
themselves as ‘making history’ (Ricoeur, 2004; White, 2007, p. 243).
But on the other hand, Gadamer’s attitude towards historical consciousness also approximates
the competency approach, albeit in very critical way. The problem Gadamer identiﬁes concerns the
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type of understanding historical consciousness implies. The acknowledgement of the historical
relativity of the past has resulted in an epistemological dilemma that became increasingly visible
during the so-called ‘crisis of historicism’ in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century. The problem
is that if one acknowledges historical consciousness to be an insight in the relativity of the past, it
also implies the relativity of the present. How then, can one escape one’s own relative historical
horizon in order to understand the past on its own terms? Gadamer thus questioned the episte-
mological foundation of Romantic hermeneutics and historicism, which accounted for the alterity
of the past, but not for the historicity of the contemporary observer. It was highly problematic,
Gadamer noticed, that historical consciousness required the absence of prejudice, whereas the
prejudices with which one approaches the past are a main characteristic of human historicity
(Makita, 1993, p. 322).
Building on the legacy of Heidegger’s phenomenology, Gadamer arrives at the position that
historical consciousness cannot escape its own historicity, that it cannot entail a normative supra-
historical understanding of or an orientation to the past. Historical consciousness had been falsely
understood as such as it had denied the interpreter’s own historicity by requiring the methodo-
logical removal of prejudices and a leap out of one’s own historical position in order to think
historically, that is, thinking on and in the terms of the historical text that is analysed. Rather than
acknowledging the historical position of the interpreter, historical consciousness demanded it be
annulled. Comparing the interpretation of a historical source text to a conversation, Gadamer
identiﬁed a central problem. What happens is that the interpreter claims to understand the opinion
of the conversational partner by bracketing his own opinion. In a true conversation, however, both
conversation partners display a fundamental openness to each other’s truth claims. Then the
interpreter does not bracket his own historically situated pre- or fore-understanding of the text,
but utilizes it in order to make the text meaningful to oneself. This means, that the conversation
can also alter the opinion of the interpreter, when one—for example—is grasped by remarks that
one did not expect based on the preunderstanding of the text. What both conversation partners
share is the subject matter (die Sache) of the conversation, which both approach from within their
own horizons of understanding.
The true conversation, Gadamer states, corresponds with what he calls wirkungsgeschichtliches
Bewusstsein—translated as ‘historically eﬀected consciousness’ (Gadamer, 2006, p. 336)—a con-
sciousness that is both aware of the historicity of the past, and of the historicity of the conceptual
and interpretive framework of the subject. Historically eﬀected consciousness includes a meta-
historical dimension, meaning an awareness of the relativity and limitations of one’s own histori-
city. To Gadamer, historically eﬀected consciousness is not a concept that ought to replace
historical consciousness as a better theory of historical understanding, it is simply historical
consciousness becoming aware of its own historicity. It is a historical consciousness that under-
stands the necessity of an open conversation with the past and the impossibility of bracketing the
pre-understanding of the interpreter without violating the horizon of the text (Makita, 1993,
p. 325). It acknowledges the traditions of interpretation and understanding in which the interpreter
ﬁnds himself, but does not utilize this as a ﬁxed frame of interpretation. Rather, it displays an
openness to other, unexpected voices that may challenge the interpreter’s horizon. We can thus
conclude that to Gadamer true historical consciousness is historically eﬀected consciousness.
There are at least two problematic aspects to Gadamer’s theory. First, in his hermeneutic model
of understanding Gadamer pays little attention to social power relations (Habermas, 1990).
Understanding implies being able to identify and to articulate—mainly verbally—various perspec-
tives on the same (historical) subject matter or situation (Grever, 2012). Language discloses the
world we share with others, allowing us to understand each other. From early childhood we learn
to speak and to write, hence we learn to participate in a linguistic community. Because languages
are translatable into one another, we can also understand foreign people, cultures and worlds
(Gadamer, 2006, p. 386–389). Although Gadamer makes an important statement here, disclosing
the world through language does not guarantee a common reference point of dialogue (Vasterling,
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2002). Without a common reference point it is diﬃcult or even impossible to have a genuine
dialogue. Certainly if we realize that a necessary condition for any dialogue is a commitment of the
interlocutors to treat each other as equals in a spirit of mutual respect (Lefstein, 2006).
Another, second, problematic aspect in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is that by presenting histori-
cally eﬀected consciousness as an advanced form of historical consciousness he implicitly assumes
a kind of linear progression by not detaching historically eﬀected consciousness from the rise of
historical consciousness in modernity. Gadamer sees historically eﬀected consciousness not as an
understanding of an objective past, but as a mediation of past and present, and does acknowledge
that such mediation also took place prior to the rise of modern historical consciousness
(Gadamer, 2006, p. 295, p. 305). Yet on a closer look, the problem of linearity is not that proble-
matic as Gadamer’s theory does not entail a return to a premodern understanding of history,
precisely because one cannot erase the legacy of historicism from one’s Wirkungsgeschichte. The
linearity that constitutes modern historical consciousness cannot and need not be annulled,
because it is part of the tradition that constitutes the fore-understanding of any Western inter-
preter. Yet, this very fact should be reckoned by historical consciousness.
Thus, despite the limitations, Gadamer opens up a notion of historical consciousness that is
aware of the historicity on which it operates. This meta-historical consciousness is not always
required for historical understanding—most often an understanding of the subject matter is
reached based on a formal and content-wide reading of the text without any challenges to the
preunderstanding of the interpreter. But when the text speaks to the interpreter in ways unfore-
seen or when the diﬀerence between interpreter and text dominates the conversation, then this
diﬀerence can only lead to understanding on the basis of a historically eﬀected consciousness that
takes the historically given metahistorical assumptions of the interpreter into account. This also
highlights the ontological dimension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics: understanding changes our
disposition in the world and aﬀects the ways in which we approach whatever is familiar or
unfamiliar to us.
This perspective solves the epistemological issues historical consciousness faces, particularly the
risk of assuming the Western conception of history to have universal validity when operationalizing
the notion of historical consciousness. Instead, incorporating historically eﬀected consciousness
into the notion of historical consciousness would force scholars to reﬂect on these assumptions
and would also force them to include this meta-reﬂection in their models of historical under-
standing. This is also where the challenge lies for history education. How to operationalize such
a notion of historical consciousness remains the question. We will now outline some possibilities to
promote inclusive and nuanced historical understanding in contemporary history education by
using this elaborated notion of historical consciousness.
4. Opportunities for historically eﬀected consciousness in history education
Although sometimes history education scholars do refer to Gadamer (e.g. Wineburg, 2001, p. 10;
Seixas, 2004, 2017), and although Gadamer was one of the sources of inspiration for Rüsen and
other history didacticians, they did not necessarily build their didactic models on his hermeneutics.
Rüsen for example stands much closer to Habermas than to Gadamer in ultimately relying on an
authoritative notion of universal rational science (Megill, 1994). His most recent book only men-
tions Gadamer in two footnotes (Rüsen, 2017). Notwithstanding the lip service to Gadamer, most
contemporary scholars often rely on the competency approach. This enables them to conceptualise
historical consciousness in reference to how people use the past, how they learn and engage with
historical knowledge (Clark & Peck, 2018). Hence various models and matrixes with didactic
stepping stones for developing ‘historical understanding’, ‘historical reasoning’, ‘historical thinking’,
‘historical thinking concepts’ and ‘understanding ﬁrst-order and second order concepts’ (Carretero
& Lee, 2014; Seixas & Morton, 2013; Van Boxtel & Van Drie, 2018) have been developed within the
competency framework. This is also the case with Körber’s broad deﬁnition of historical
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consciousness. Although this deﬁnition includes ‘the cultural, social, temporal and individual
diversity of relating to the past’, acknowledging that there are no ‘backward’ (i.e. ‘non-Western’)
cultures, Körber (2016, p. 446) insists on striving for an integral concept of ‘better or more
elaborate’ historical consciousness. Yet, Gadamer conceptualizes historical consciousness in
a much broader way as an ontological category, relating to and aﬀecting being. He argues that
the hermeneutic circle of understanding is not a ‘methodological circle’ or a procedure of under-
standing, it primarily means clarifying ‘the condition in which understanding takes place’ (Gadamer,
2006, p. 295).
We seem to encounter a contradiction here. Can we speak of strengthening or enhancing
historical consciousness in the practice of history education if it relates to being? Lee (2004b,
p. 5) already had his doubts about a model of historical consciousness that represents a ladder-like
progression with diﬀerent stages, succeeding one stage and displacing another. In his view
historical consciousness is not a learning approach but a theory for understanding the ways in
which people turn to the past to understand their societies and themselves. To what extent is such
a broader hermeneutic approach in history education based on normative assumptions? The
emphasis on understanding and, more particularly, the aim of history education that students
will acquire knowledge about diﬀerent perspectives on the past as part of historical thinking skills,
is typical for a pluralist democracy (Barton & Levstik, 2004). Not for a totalitarian state. It could be
argued that a narrow deﬁnition of historical consciousness—which tends to concentrate on
historical content knowledge (Körber, 2016) and does not include an understanding of the
historicity of the self but mainly aims at understanding the past on its own terms—could actually
be achieved in totalitarian states. After all, totalitarian states are eager to establish a sense of
discontinuity with the past as a means of self-legitimization (Zerubavel, 2003, p. 101–110). But
these states do not want students engaging in a discussion with the past and the traditions of
interpretation that make up the Wirkungsgeschichte, as this could lead to an unwanted revaluation
of the present. The aim of totalitarian states not to challenge the pastness of the past, but to totally
control over and ossify the Wirkungsgeschichte is clearly illustrated in George Orwell’s 1984 (1949).
For this reason, we argue that when talking about strengthening historical consciousness in
democratic societies the dimension of historical consciousness Gadamer called ‘historically eﬀected
consciousness’ should be explicitly incorporated in history education. This will generate both
challenges and opportunities for creatively teaching history.
First of all, we have to acknowledge that history education needs to methodologically reﬂect on
its own traditions, that is, the tradition of interpretation in which it stands. In the hermeneutic circle
—which describes understanding as the interplay of movement of tradition and the movement of
the interpreter (Gadamer, 2006, p. 293)—tradition is not a precondition or something that develops
separately from us. We participate and co-produce the evolution of tradition. The task is to discover
and to clarify this condition in which understanding takes place. A total understanding of this
tradition can never be completely achieved, just as it is impossible to completely free from tradition
(Gadamer, 2006, p. 301). Historical consciousness always involves a form of self-reﬂection and an
openness of the interpreter to the various narratives and voices as part of tradition (Gadamer, 2006,
p. 289), which are important goals of many history education curricula. Yet, although Gadamer
focuses on understanding tradition and emphasizes its historicity, he does not deny the possibility
of acquiring knowledge. Human beings are part of pre-existing traditions (that determine the
preunderstanding of any act of interpretation), which they try to understand, but they can also
reinterpret them actively according to future desires (Meyer, 2006, p. 329). Regarding educational
settings, this means that students—often guided by their teachers—can acquire knowledge, norms
and stories about the past that circulate in the transmitted stream of historiography, their families,
communities and society, while at the same time reinterpreting the transferred body of knowledge
and insights. This also means that it is crucial to make students aware of plural perspectives on the
transferred body of knowledge and to make them aware of the signiﬁcance of unfulﬁlled possibi-
lities in the past, because in any given historical situation there have been multiple potentialities.
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Then they might realize that the course of history is not ﬁxed and that the outcomes could also
have been diﬀerent.
This is not an easy task, as several studies have shown that having a debate in multicultural
classrooms can be very demanding (Grever, 2012; Gross & Terra, 2018; Grever, 2018; Savenije, van
Boxtel, & Grever, 2014). Students with diﬀerent cultural backgrounds often have other, sometimes
opposing, world views and conceptions of history. This opposition can evoke strong emotions
when discussing sensitive topics. The aim then is, ﬁrst of all, that students listen to each other and
reﬂect on what they hear, and how they see themselves related to these diﬀerences. This is in itself
already a challenging task. In this way teachers can stimulate self-understanding and respect for
other worldviews. An important condition to achieve this is to make students aware of the fact that
it is possible to understand each other’s perspectives without necessarily consenting to them. For
instance, a dialogue between Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Israeli high school students about the Israeli
War of Independence—which Israelis consider as the birth of their nation—can be rather stren-
uous. Goldberg (2016, p. 255–256) shows that when studying this narrative based on conﬂicting
sources, these minority and majority students come to diﬀerent conclusions and uphold diﬀerent
views. However, engaging them in this multiple-perspective teaching approach can also result in
understanding of how one’s own perspective on the conﬂict is shaped by transmitted frames of
interpretation. Possibly this approach can even promote intergroup dialogue and mutual
understanding.
In the second place, historical consciousness taken as historically eﬀected consciousness, pre-
sumes the treatment of multiperspectivity in history education. Multiperspectivity does not imply
a full understanding of the intentions of multiple historical actors or authors, but it relies on
a fundamental hermeneutic openness towards other perspectives that might challenge one’s
assumptions about the past (Meyer, 2006; Grever, 2012, p. 80–81). In this sense multiperspectivity
is as much about learning about the past as it is about learning about the limits of your own
assumptions and prejudices. But understanding primarily means to understand the content of what
is said, and only secondarily to understand and identify someone else’s meaning or perspective as
such. For this reason the most basic hermeneutic precondition is, as we have noticed in the
previous section, the fore-understanding of people, as this fore-understanding will—when con-
cerned with the same subject—determine ‘what can be realized as uniﬁed meaning’ (Gadamer,
2006, p. 294).
In the case of the aforementioned commemoration at the military cemetery in Ysselstein, the
antifascist organizations and the educator of the cemetery have opposite opinions about
whether or not a commemoration in the presence of uniformed German soldiers is appropriate,
but they only can hold diﬀerent views because they share the same subject matter: i.e. the
impact of remembering large-scale violence during the second World War. Both also largely
share the same Wirkungsgeschichte, and share an interpretive framework with which they
approach the subject matter. However, they lack or perhaps refuse a common point of
reference. The attitudes with which they approach it diﬀer signiﬁcantly: the antifascist organiza-
tions categorically renounce any commemoration at the cemetery because Nazi war criminals
are buried there (van Kasbergen, van Griensven, & van Graaﬀ, 2018). In doing so they avoid the
necessity to review their own interpretive framework of World War II as a war between good
and evil. They display a degree of historical consciousness in the narrow sense, but no
historically eﬀected consciousness. To others the interesting situation of Bundeswehr soldiers
commemorating fallen German soldiers of World War II may give rise to a more investigative
attitude towards the situation, leading not to interpreting it in terms of a ﬁxed moral frame of
interpretation, but to challenging such frameworks in favour of a more nuanced approach. In
this sense the Ysselstein cemetery oﬀers educational opportunities (and limitations) to make
young people aware of their own historicity and to enhance (critical) historical understanding.
Translated to history education practice this means that for a group of young students (say
15–17 years) to really understand the discussion about the military ritual at the Ysselstein cemetery,
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it requires at least four conditions: 1. access to information about the subject matter, including the
various involved perspectives; 2. someone who facilitates a dialogue—e.g. a museum educator or
history teacher—and provides time for studying the perspectives; 3. the willingness of the conversa-
tional partners—in this case fellow students—to engage in a dialogue about the subject matter; 4. the
recognition that a joint agreement on the discussion topic between students is not necessary, and is
not the goal of understanding.
Regarding the ﬁrst condition, it is obvious that a conversation about a subject matter has to be
based on accessible and reliable information, inspired by stories that should be available to individuals
to form social identities through which they ‘learn to subjectively read the world’ (Den Heyer, 2018,
p. 227). The storage and retrieval of information in communities and organizations prevents societal
amnesia. Students have to learn where to ﬁnd and how to assess information. The second condition
requires educators who are capable of supervising the conversation. Their task is to support the
translation of direct experiences of the students (‘Erlebnisse’) into cognitive experiences
(‘Erfahrungen’). Translating direct experiences—for instance evoked by a military ritual at a German
war cemetery—into cognitive experiences, requires teaching students a basic respect for commu-
nication rules (listening to the other, using clear and decent language) and giving them time for
reﬂection. Gadamer explains this process as ‘the ongoing integrative process in which what we
encounter widens our horizon, but only by overturning an existing perspective, which we can then
perceive was erroneous or at least narrow’ (Gadamer, 2006, p. XIII). By creating a dialogue about
diﬀerent viewpoints students acquire knowledge of historical contexts and become aware of tradition,
achieved in history educational settings (museums, schools, sites of remembrance like a cemetery).
However, without the third condition—the willingness of the conversational partners—a dialogue will
be impossible. Lastly, but no less important: understanding does not necessarily mean achieving
a common outcome of the discussion. Such a condition can be threatening to students who may fear
that their identity is being compromised or even denied. It would block a dialogue between the
interlocutors, hampering them to identify and understand other perspectives (Grever, 2012; Vasterling,
2002). On the other hand, being inquisitive with the subject matter over time might change the
perspectives or horizons of the students (De Mul, 2009).
Currently, the application of multiperspectivity in history education has become one of the main
goals of educational curricula in many Western countries (e.g. Grever, 2012; Nygren, Vinterek,
Thorp, & Taylor, 2017; Seixas & Morton, 2013; Stradling, 2003). In some countries this approach
has even become an obligatory part of the history curriculum (Wansink, Akkerman, Zuiker, &
Wubbels, 2018, p. 22). In the context of their research, Wansink et al. (2018, p. 3–4) describe
three temporal layers of multiperspectivity, which are relevant to our argument: 1. perspectives of
subjects who are contemporaries of the historical object represented by primary sources describing
for instance the liberation of a an occupied country; 2. a diachronic layer with perspectives
changing in the course of time, for instance diﬀerent views of a historian in 1945 compared to
a view of a historian in 2010; 3. perspectives referring to the present with subjects who take
diﬀerent positions towards a historical object. All three layers reﬂect on various and perhaps
divergent perspectives in past and present, linked to the impact of tradition, the historical eﬀect
(Wirkungsgeschichte). But only the second layer has the potential of including historically eﬀected
consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) in history education practices. In fact, this layer
reveals the historicity of various perspectives, whether historiographic or popular and could be
connected to reﬂecting upon the traditions and perspectives (Den Heyer, 2018) that determine the
interpretive framework of the student. In that case students can also revaluate their own position in
the present.
5. Conclusion
Historical consciousness is an enigmatic concept employed in historiography, history didactics and
educational sciences in diﬀerent ways. In order to disentangle the various meanings attributed to
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the concept, we have discerned two paradigms in its contemporary use. The ﬁrst is promoted by
intellectual and conceptual historians, such as Reinhart Koselleck (1979/2000) and François Hartog
(2015), and studies the rise of historical consciousness as a collective mentality or attitude towards
the past historically. However, by studying it as a historical phenomenon, a modern conception of
history and modern forms of historical representation are already assumed in their analyses (Grever
& Adriaansen, 2017). The second paradigm is prominent in history education studies and translates
historical consciousness as a set of skills that enables individuals to understand the past on its own
terms. This set of skills is something that needs to be developed in history education through
historical thinking and reasoning. Acquiring historical consciousness is often presented in terms of
a stadial progression towards consciousness. In such conceptualisations historical consciousness
appears as a universal trait, with the past appearing as an object that is to be understood on its
own terms without any immediate implications for the interpreter.
In order to mediate between the two paradigms, we have turned to Gadamerian hermeneutics.
With Gadamer we acknowledge both paradigms, but signal weaknesses in both when conceptua-
lizing them independently from each other. The main weakness of the educational paradigm is that
it misacknowledges the full implications of the fact that historical consciousness is historically
embedded in Western modernity. Treating it solely as a cognitive-epistemological category results
in overlooking the historicity of the interpreter, that is: the embeddedness in an interpretive
tradition that may or may not align with the historical interpretive framework and tradition of
modern historical consciousness as it has developed since the late eighteenth century. A more
encompassing notion of historical consciousness involves the consciousness of the historicity of the
interpreter in the Wirkungsgeschichte of (Western) historical thought. Such consciousness entails
the realization that a modern conception of history deﬁnes the pre-understanding with which we
approach historical representations, such as primary sources, history textbooks, or heritage sites.
History educators’ ﬁrm belief that the past is distant and ‘behind’ us is eﬀectuated by this pre-
understanding. It is not a universal principle as this conception of history has only been constituted
with the rise of modern historical consciousness. We have to acknowledge this in order to be able
to recognize and understand traditions of thought that are alien to Western historical conscious-
ness without forcing them into a model of historical thought as belonging to an earlier stage of
consciousness yet to be developed.
We have discerned two focal points for our broadened notion of historical consciousness in
history education research. First, meta-historical reﬂection on the Wirkungsgeschichte should be
acknowledged, as too often in educational research an objectivity of the past is falsely—often
implicitly—assumed, as are the possibilities to think historically. Second, we have stressed the
possibilities to thematize multiperspectivity as a central element of historical consciousness.
Multiperspectivity not only implies the identiﬁcation of diﬀerent historical vantage points, but
above all an understanding of how these vantage points are embedded in the stream of trans-
mitted traditions and how they are related to one’s pre-understanding of the past. The openness to
listen to unexpected voices, we argued, is a central tenet of a pluralist democracy.
Including historically eﬀected consciousness in the concept of historical consciousness does
oﬀer a wide range of opportunities, for history education scholars as well as history educators. It
can include an understanding of processes of remembering and thereby increase possibilities to
connect history education to heritage education. It can enhance attempts to use history for peace
building and multicultural integration processes by acknowledging that creating a shared narrative
will not suﬃce as long as conﬂicting traditions of interpreting historical narratives are not
addressed and reﬂected upon. It acknowledges that there is no ﬁxed and universal pathway to
historical consciousness, nor that historical consciousness only entails a cognitive skillset. As our
traditions and frameworks of historical interpretation continually change and are continually
challenged, so too are the parameters we set on the cognitive competencies of our students
born out of speciﬁc contemporary demands. This means that we should reﬂect upon the adapt-
ability of our didactic models to speciﬁc hermeneutic contexts and situations.
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